(This is a slightly revised and augmented version of my 1981 diploma dissertation [Funkhouser, 1981]. The bibliography is available below in the list of references.)
Note 1: This "history" of déjà experience is actually more of a record of "firsts" associated with the phenomenon, sprinkled here and there with a few musings. I am not a historian. What is reported here, then, is just what could be gleaned by going through the published literature and tracking down articles that were referred to. Here, too, I am only referring to western literature in the major European languages. What is known about what we call déjà vu in other cultures and literary traditions is as yet unknown to me
Note 2: There is quite a lot of overlap between what is presented here and what is available in the explanations page.
Note 3: There may well be persons among those reading this who are better qualified to give information about the period which I am here touching upon than I am. If they would care to correspond with me I would be most grateful to be able to fill in some of the more glaring holes in this account. I would be particularly appreciative for leads concerning any additional literature about déjà vu prior to 1815 and/or in other cultures.
Note 4: The bibliographic details of many of the papers cited here can be found under the abstracts menu.
The Earliest Examples
According to the various [link: surveys] that have been published déjà vu is a fairly common occurrence, certainly not rare. One would be inclined to think, then, that it was every bit as usual in the past as it is today. Surprisingly, there does not appear to be much interest in the phenomenon, historically, until the early part of the 1800s. Does this imply that people had no experience of déjà vu previously, that we are witnessing the emergence of something new on the stage of human evolution? Or was it just too puzzling and too troublesome for thinkers at that time to venture observations and theories? Or could it be that it was too insignificant when compared with other issues which were more pressing?It is my contention that, though most of the foregoing may be at least partly true, there was another factor. It could well have been something of a "hot potato", so to speak, tainted as it was with the supporting ideas of reincarnation. Thus, research and reflection about it probably tended to shy away from it, favoring less "occult" topics. This was the problem for St Augustine (354 - 430 AD) and I suspect his comments (to follow) very much stamped secular and clerical thinking for subsequent generations. In order that St Augustine's remarks can be properly understood, though, I first have to mention an incident recorded by Ovid which purports to quote a speech in the advocacy of vegetarianism given once by Pythagoras. In it are found the following words:
"Our souls are deathless, and ever. when they have left their former seat, do they live in new abodes and dwell in the bodies that have received them. I myself (for I well remember it) at the time of the Trojan war was Euphorbus, son of Panthous. Recently, in Juno's temple in Argos, Abas' city, I recognized the shield which I once wore on my left arm." (lines 158-164).
Here is found the earliest reference that I know of in western classical literature to what seems to be an incident of precognition, derived from a previous lifetime, or false recognition, depending on your persuasion. (Plato also believed in transmigration of souls). Ovid's account, if not the speech itself, must have caused quite a controversy because 5t. Augustine, 300 years after Ovid, felt called upon to offer the following rebuttal:
"For we must not acquiesce in their story, who assert the Samian Pythagoras recollected some things ... which he experienced when he was previously here in another body; and others, that they experienced something of the same sort in their minds: but it may be conjectured that these were untrue recollections, such as we commonly experience "in sleep, when we fancy we remember, as though we had done it or seen it, what we never did or saw at all; and that the minds of these persons, even though awake, were affected in this way at the suggestion of malignant and deceitful spirits, whose care it is to confirm or to sow some false belief concerning the changes of souls, in order to deceive men". (On the Trinity, Chapter XV, Book XII)
Reading carefully, one finds here what I believe to be the earliest reference to déjà vu. Given my own experiences of it, I do not find that incidences of false recognition in dreams that I have had are of the same quality as my déjà vu experiences, as he seems to believe. Nevertheless, it would seem that the experience was well enough known and widely enough experienced that he felt it necessary to make such arguments.
He has not been the only one to maintain that déjà vu might be caused by outside agencies. This is probably the best place to mention that F W H Myers (1895), one of the founding members of the British Society for Psychical Research, published a two-part, book length article on what he termed "The Subliminal Mind" (a precursor to modern ideas of the unconscious) where he remarked: " ... I ascribe some precognitions to the reasoned foresight of disembodied spirits, just as I ascribe some retrocognitions to their surviving memory" (p. 340).
In passage 71 of the Tsurezuregusa ((徒然草, Essays in Idleness or "The Harvest of Leisure", written between 1330 and 1332 AD), the Japanese monk Yoshida Kenkō wrote: "It has happened on various occasions ... that I have felt, just after someone has said something or I have seen something or thought of something, that it has occurred before. I cannot remember when it was, but I feel absolutely certain that the thing has happened. Am I the only one who has such impressions?"
Two and half centuries later, a remark on this can be found in the oldest commentary, the 1604 AD Tsurezuregusa Jumyou-in Shou (徒然草寿命院抄) which, when translated, says “This passage is well known. Surely everyone’s minds are like this.”
Déjà Vu "Firsts" : The Post-1800 Era
After St Augustine almost 1500 years passed before someone ventured to write about déjà vu experiences again (as far as I know). The earliest account I have come across to date occurs in a novel by Sir Walter Scott (1815), Guy Mannering or the Astrologer. There one finds the protagonist revisiting the ruins in Scotland of the castle grounds from which he had been kidnapped as a young boy. He asks,
"Why is it that some scenes awaken thoughts which belong as it were to dreams of early and shadowy recollection, such as my old Brahmin Moonshie would have ascribed to a state of previous existence? Is it the visions of our sleep that float confusedly in our memory, and are recalled by the appearance of such real objects as in any respect correspond to the phantoms they presented to our imagination? How often do we find ourselves in society which we have never before met, and yet feel impressed with a mysterious and ill-defined consciousness that neither the scene, the speakers nor the subject, are entirely new; nay, feel as if we could anticipate that part of the conversation which has not yet taken place!"(chap. 41).
(There are two theories the cause of déjà vu mentioned explicitly in this passage and a further one is implicit since he had actually been there before!)
Although only published in 1840, it seems the English romantic poet, Shelley (1815 / 1840) also wrote about a déjà experience. After his death, his widow, Mary Shelley, famous in her own right as the authoress of Frankenstein, published a collection of Shelley's prose notes with the title Speculations on Metaphysics in 1840. She assigned the fragment bearing the heading "Catalogue of the Phenomena of Dreams, as Connecting Sleeping and Waking" to 1815, seven years before his death. It seems that Shelley was the earliest to see explicitly a connection between his déjà vu experience and his own preceding dream (Funkhouser, 1983). He wrote about an experience he had had at Oxford while walking there with a friend. Describing the scenery he said:
"The scene was a common scene ... The effect that it produced on me was not such as could have been expected. I suddenly remembered to have seen that exact scene in some dream of long ... "Here I was obliged to leave off, overcome by thrilling horror!" (p. 297)
Before turning to more scientific thought on the topic, no such survey would be complete without citing the passage that is probably most often quoted in the déjà vu literature, namely that found in Charles Dickens' 1850 book, David Copperfield:
"We have all some experience of a feeling, that comes over us occasionally, of what we are saying and doing having been said and done before. in a remote time -- of our having been surrounded, dim ages ago, by the same faces, objects, and circumstances -- of our knowing perfectly what will be said next, as if we suddenly remembered it" (chap 39).
There were many other literary allusions to the phenomenon in the literature of the period, too many to cite them all here.
There is one figure, though, who serves well as a bridge to more scientific thinking and that is the eminent Bostonian and Harvard Professor of Anatomy, Oliver Wendell Holmes. In 1858 he published a collection of thoughts that he had contributed regularly to a local newspaper. When published as a book this compilation was given the title, The Autocrat of the Breakfast Table. There one finds one of the boarders saying, "All at once a conviction flashes through us that we have been in the same precise circumstances as at the present instant, once or many times before" (pp. 69-70).
Probably the earliest published medical-scientific thinking on the topic of déjà vu is to be found in the 1844 book by the English doctor, Sir Arthur L. Wigan, The Duality of the Mind . In 1817 he attended the funeral of the Princess Charlotte at Windsor. He had had little sleep the night before and had eaten nothing during the day preceding the midnight interment (all inns and eating establishments were closed in mourning). After four hours of standing in St George's Chapel he said he was very near fainting. Suddenly, as the coffin was being lowered into its place of final rest, he "felt not merely an impression, but a conviction [italics his], that I had seen the whole scene before on some former occasion, and had heard even the very words addressed to myself by Sir George Naylor" (p. 87).
From his experience he derived the thesis that such experiences only occur when one is tired, so that one of the hemispheres of the brain is more or less inattentive to what is going on, or even asleep. Then something causes it to wake up, but it digests its information about the situation after the other, awake hemisphere has already acknowledged it. The time interval, he said, "may seem to have been many years" since we have nothing upon which to base our judgment of the elapsed time (p. 85). Looking through his book (which has been re-published), one is amazed how much his thinking anticipated some of the most modern areas of current neurological research.
Subsequent to Wigan there have been several other authors with the same or similar ideas (e.g., Horwicz[1876], Huppert [1868], Jensen [1874], Wiedemeister [1871], and Maudsley [1889]). One of the more recent revivals borrows electrical engineering terminology to speak of "the introduction of a delay network on a part of the input side (Comfort, 1977; see also Efron, 1963). Wigan's idea did not, however, meet with general acceptance. It was criticized already in 1874 by Sander and, more thoroughly, by Kraepelin in 1887 and Bonne in 1907.
Terminology
At the turn of the century there were many terms being used to designate this experience, in addition to "déjà vu". This term itself first entered the scientific literature, it seems, in 1876. A Professor of Philosophy at a classical high school in Poitiers, M. Boirac (1876), had a letter published in the Revue Philosophique in which he spoke of “le sentiment du déjà vu”. He described his own experiences and classified them as one type of illusionary memory. However, his use of the terminology was forgotten. Dugas (1894), in his paper on false memories, credits Lalande (1893) with having first used the term, though he only used it along with several others.
It was in 1896 that the term "déjà vu" was officially proposed by F. L. Arnaud at a meeting of the Societe medico-psychologique to designate the phenomenon. He objected that the other terminologies such as false recognition, false memory, paramnesia and reminiscence, were too broad. He felt that "already seen" more nearly fitted the experience as it was encountered (it is also more neutral from a theoretical point of view). This suggestion was taken up by a number of writers, including Prof. Pierre Janet (1905). who had been present at the meeting. It was taken over, too, into popular parlance, since it was short and to the point. "Déjà vécu (already lived), as a number of authors have insisted, would probably have been more accurate and a better choice, but it never gained wide acceptance.
The other terms persisted in the technical literature for a while, however, with “paramnesia" being the other most widely preferred, particularly in English-language publications. This term was apparently due to Burnham (1888/89) who published a long study on memory in the American Journal of Psychology. His third section he entitled "Paramnesia", a term which it seems he devised, but which he claimed had been suggested by Prof. Emil Kraepelin (1886). My suspicion is that it is his “Graecised” form of Kraepelin's ("erinnerungsfälschung”) (while speaking of other names for it, I understand that déjà vu is called "kitchikan" in Japanese and "si cheng xang jian" in Chinese).
Déjà Vu and Epilepsy
The term "reminiscence” also has its history. It is associated with the long and (in my view) rather unfortunate connection between déjà vu and what is known in the medical literature as temporal lobe or psychomotor epilepsy. This chapter in the history of déjà vu began in 1870 when, in a short, two paragraph paper in "The Practitioner", a young medical doctor using the pseudonym "Quaerens” wrote that he had often had déjà vu experiences as a boy, but that these had become "more intense and more frequent than usual" just preceding his first epileptic attack. He mentions that the latter had been triggered during a time of overwork, which suggests that fatigue was also possibly involved as a precipitator. He said that on two occasions an incident of déjà vu was followed the next day by an epileptic seizure. Thus he surmised that there might be some connection between the two and that déjà vu could be indicative of an epileptic disposition.
The matter might have rested there, but ten years (and some fifteen seizures) later he became a patient of Dr. John Hughlings Jackson, probably the leading neurologist of his day, certainly in matters dealing with epilepsy. It was Jackson who coined the term "dreamy state” {which, according to Bingley [1958], “is practically identical with the modern concept of psychomotor seizure” [p. 102]). Déjà vu, or any inexplicable feeling of familiarity, was called by Jackson (1876) "reminiscence" (probably borrowed from Plato), and was included in what was known as "intellectual aura" or warnings which could precede or comprise an epileptic discharge.
He had another patient, also a medical doctor, whom he designated "Z", who had similar symptoms. He called his "reminiscence" recollection and described it as
"what is occupying the attention is what has occupied it before, and indeed has been familiar, but has been for a time forgotten, and now is recovered with a slight sense of satisfaction as if it had been sought for ... At the same time, or ... more accurately in immediate sequence, I am dimly aware that the recollection is fictitious and my state abnormal. The recollection is always started by another person's voice, or by my own verbalised thought, or by what I am reading and mentally verbalise; and I think that during the abnormal state I generally verba1ise some such phrase of simple recognition as 'Oh yes -I see' 'Of course -- I remember', etc. but a minute or two later I can recollect neither the words nor the verbalised thought which gave rise to the recollection. I only find strongly that they resemble what I have felt before under similar abnormal conditions” (p. 202) (Our thanks to Oxford University Press for permission to quote from Brain 1889, 11:179-207).
I have presented here this rather extensive quotation because I believe that this is probably characteristic of the familiarity feelings which occur sometimes in connection with temporal lobe epilepsy, and to show that the tone of it is strikingly different from accounts of déjà vu among those not afflicted with the "divine disease". I am personally inclined to believe that Quaerens had both déjà vu experiences and epilepsy, whereas Z had false familiarity feelings during his epileptic seizures. It may be of interest that it was later shown in autopsy that Z had, in fact, a "very small lesion of the left uncinate gyrus" within or upon the temporal lobe (Jackson, 1898).
In 1876, Jackson said, "It is well known that such sensations of 'reminiscence' are not uncommon in healthy people, or in trivial disorders of health."(p. 702) Moreover, in 1889, "I should never, in spite of Quaerens's case, diagnose epilepsy from the paroxysmal occurrence of 'reminiscence' without other symptoms, although I should suspect epilepsy, if ... (it) should occur very frequently" (p. 186).
Despite such admonitions. Sir James Crichton-Browne in his 1895 Cavendish lecture before the West London Medico-Surgical Society on "Dreamy Mental States" maintained that occurrences of "reminiscence" must be seen as pathological. From the literary quotations he presented (from twelve different writers!) it is clear that he was referring primarily to déjà vu. He said that it was difficult obtaining information about such experiences because those having had them were disinclined to talk about them, "from a not unwarrantable suspicion that they are somehow morbid in their nature." He quoted Quaerens and some of Dr Jackson's patients, as well as some of his own, to show what sort of epilepsy he was considering. He went on to point out that Scott, Dickens, and Rossetti all died of brain disease. though he neglected to mention which variety. He finished by saying that such disturbances should be watched for in young people and treated as one would "cerebral neurasthenia and epilepsy". (p. 75) He especially recommended "rest and liberal nourishment", the 1atter being vegetarian, if possible. Dr. Foster Kennedy in his 1911 paper, seems to have adopted these views in toto.
Thus it is that, until recently, if one spoke of déjà vu to a medically trained person, especially to a neurologist or psychiatrist, his first reaction was to think of possible temporal lobe epilepsy. Not only did Jackson include déjà vu with false familiarity in his concept of reminiscence, but others following him have tended to form their diagnoses on the basis of such historical accidents and anecdotes, rather than on scientific statistical evidence.
Even early studies, however, contradict this. In 1933, Lennox and Cobb studied 1359 cases of aura in all types of epilepsy of whom 56.2% had focal auras, sometimes more than one: of the 1059 auras analyzed only four had déjà experiences. Thus, compared with the incidence in "normal" people, the incidence of déjà vu as part of an epileptic attack is amazingly low. In another early study of tumors of the temporal lobe, Keschner et al published a study in 1936 of 110 cases and found no déjà vu in connection with this affliction. They did have two cases, though, where "dreamy states" were noticed.
Surveys
The earliest survey appears to be that of Osborn conducted at Princeton and elsewhere and mentioned in his 1884 article that he published in the North American Review. Unfortunately he does not indicate how many persons were interviewed (by questionnaire), or anything else about their ages, sex and education. He does say, though, that about one-half had had some form of déjà vu experience.
Another poor study, because of sampling difficulties, was that of Bernhard-Leroy who, in 1898, submitted his (medical) doctoral thesis on the illusion of false recognition. The study is cited here because of its historical relevance. During his research, he distributed a questionnaire (1000 copies) and published it in a French and in an American magazine. He received only 67 replies of which only 49 were usable. He added 36 from the published literature to these which brought the total to 85. He did manage to ask about and record the aspects which Osborn had neglected but he found only one correlated factor: age. Most of the respondents said that they had had more frequent and more intense déjà vu experiences when they were younger, especially during their adolescence. This fact had already been noted by Sander in 1874 and Kraepelin in 1886-7. On the other hand, there seemed to be no correlation with sex, race, class, state of health or energy level {fresh or fatigued}.
Heymans, in 1904 and 1906, made a critical review of Bernhard-Leroy's results and extended the data by questioning the students in his classes, young people between 20 and 25 years of age. In 88 cases he found 14 (16%) who often experienced déjà vu and 41 (47%) who experienced it occasionally. There did not seem to be much correlation with experiences of depersonalization, a relationship he had hoped to prove. There was more of a correlation with fatigue. Probably his most interesting finding was that persons prone to déjà vu tended to have a more emotional, more labile nature than their peers. Since Heymans's study there have been numerous studies of the incidence of déjà vu, as detailed by Neppe (1983) in his book and in the [link: survey] section of this website.
Déjà Vu and Psychoanalysis
Psychoanalysts have also contributed to the study of déjà vu. Following Freud's lead, they have not, though, been very interested in the mechanism involved in bringing déjà vu about. They have rather wanted to know what part it plays within the psychic economy as a whole: what its function is, what is achieved with it. They had a number of interesting ideas to offer, as we shall see, but unfortunately most were based only on individual patient experiences, not on survey data.
In 1904 Freud made a trip with his brother to Athens and visited the Acropolis. There he had an experience of derealization, as if what he was seeing was not real. He recounted this in a letter published in 1936 entitled "A Disturbance of Memory on the Acropolis". Therein he distinguished derealization from the related phenomenon of depersonalization, in that with the former a piece of outer reality feels strange, while with the latter a piece of one's own self seems foreign and unfamiliar. He then went on to remark that in déjà vu " ... we seek to accept something as belonging to our ego, just as in the derealization we are anxious to keep something out of us." (p. 245) He continues and says that the latter, then, is a defense mechanism.
Subsequent psychoanalytic authors have also insisted that déjà vu be considered a defense mechanism, but they have differed as to what constitutes the antagonist. Bergler (1942) said that Freud and Ferenczi (1955) believed the ego used déjà vu experiences to avoid id impulses. He himself offered examples where it seemed that pangs of conscience (super-ego) were being resisted. Arlow (1959) thought it could involve repression and reassurance in the face of anxiety ("I've been through this before and came out okay.") and an attempt at omnipotence ("I knew it all along:"). Fenichel (1974) saw repressed memories as a possible source of the anxiety. Marcovitz (1952) wrote that déjà vu was the expression of a wish for a second chance, to be back in the same situation again.
C. G. Jung (1951/1964) was so impressed by instances of déjà vu, precognitive dreams, and what he referred to as meaningful coincidences, that he developed (with Prof Wolfgang Pauli, the famous quantum physicist) his theory of synchronicity, an acausal connecting principle. Those interested are referred to Dr. von Franz's 1974 book, Number and Time, for greater detail.
I shall close this brief overview here. There has not been space to cite all the authors who have contributed to the knowledge and speculation concerning déjà vu (I had 155 references in my 1981 dissertation ), but I hope I have managed to provide enough material for those wishing to have some orientation in the literature and theories concerning this fascinating, unsettling, and as yet still relatively obscure experience.
References
1. Arlow, J A, The structure of the déjà vu experience. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association 7:611-631, 1959.
2. Arnaud, F L, Un cas d'illusion du déjà vu ou de fausse memoire [A case of the déjà vu illusion and false memory]. Annales Medico-Pyschologique 3: 455-471, 1896.
3. Augustine, Of the Trinity, Book XII, chap. XV.
4. Bergler, E, A contribution to the psychoanalysis of déjà vu. The Psychoanalytic Quarterly 11:165-170, 1942.
5. Bernhard-Leroy, E, Etude sur l'illusion de fausse reconnaissance [Study of the illusion of false recognition]. Thesis, Faculté de Medecine de Paris. 1898.
6. Bingley, T, Mental symptoms in temporal lobe epilepsy and temporal lobe gliomas. Acta Psychiatria et Neurologica (Kbh). 33 Suppl
120: 1-151, 1958.
7. Boirac, E, (Note without title). Revue Philosophique 1: 430-431, 1876.
8. Bonne C, Sur la symmétrie bilatéerale du corps et sur l'indépendance fonctionelle des hémispheres cérébraux [On bilateral body symmetry and the functional independence of the cerebral hemispheres]. Archives de Neurologie 1: 177, 293, 370, 467, 1907.
9. Burnham, W H, Memory historically and experimentally considered (chap. III: Paramnesia). American Journal of Psychology 2: 431-464, 1889.
10. Comfort A, Homuncular identity-sense as a déjà-vu phenomenon. British Journal of Medical Psychology 50: 313-5, 1977.
11. Crichton-Browne, J, Dreamy mental states. Lancet, July 6: 1-5 ; July 13: 73-75, 1895.
12. Dickens, C, David Copperfield. London: Bradbury & Evans, 1850.
13. Dugas, L, Observations sur la Fausse Memoire [Observations on false memory]. Revue Philosophique 38: 34-45, 1894.
14. Efron R, Temporal perception, aphasia and déjà vu. Brain 86: 403- 424, 1963.
15. Fenichel, O, Psychoanalytische Neurosenlehre [Psychoanalytic neurosis theory]. Olten: Walter Verlag, 1974.
16. Ferenzi, S, A case of "déjà vu". The Problems and Methods of Psychoanalysis. in: Final Contributions to Psycho-analysis. London: Hogarth Press, 1955 (a translation into English of Ein Fall von "déjà vu". Bausteine zur Psychoanalyse 3:161-163, 1912).
17. Freiherr von Feuchtersleben, E, Lehrbuch der ärztlichen Seelenkunde [Textbook of medical psychology]. Vienna: C. Gerold Verlag, 1845.
18. Freud, S, A disturbance of memory on the Acropolis. The Standavd Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud. London: Hogarth Press. 1953.
19. Funkhouser, A T, The dream theory of déjà vu. Parapsychological Journal of South Africa 4: 2, 1983.
20. Funkhouser, A T, Déjà Vu : Déjà Rêvé. Diploma thesis, C G Jung Institute, Küsnacht, Switzerland. 1981.
21. Heymans, G, Eine enquete über depersonalisation und fausse reconnaissance [An inquiry concerning depersonalization and false recognition]. Zeitschrift für Psychologie und der Physiologie der Sinnesorgane. 36: 321-343, 1904 and 43: 1-17, 1904.
22. Holmes, 0 W, The Autocrat of the Breakfast Table. Boston: Phillips, Samson & Co., 1858.
23. Horwicz M, (Note without title). Revue Philosophique 1: 430, 1876
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25. Jackson, J H, Lectures on epilepsy. Medical Times and Gazette. Dec 23, 700-702, 1876.
26. Jackson, J H, On a particular variety of epilepsy. Brain 11:179-207, 1889.
27. Jackson, J H and Colman, W S, Case of epilepsy with tasting movements and "dreamy state". Brain 21: 580-590, 1898.
28. Janet, P, Apropos du "déjà vu" [About déjà vu]. Journal de Psychologie, Normale et Pathologique 2:289-307, 1905.
29. Jensen J, Doppelwahrnehmungen [Dual perceptions]. Archiv für Psychiatrie 4: 547-558, 1874.
30. Jung, C G, On Synchronicity. Collected Works of C. G. Jung, Vol. 8, Bollingen Series, Princenton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966.
31. Kennedy, F, The symptomatology of temporosphenoidal tumours. Archives of Internal Medicine 8:317-350, 1911.
32. Kraepelin, E Ueber Erinnerungsfälschungen [About memory falsifications]. Archiv für Psychiatrie 17: 830-843, 1886 and 18:199-239; 18:395-436,1887.
33. Lalande, A, Des paramnesies [The paramnesias]. Revue Philosophique 36:485-497,1893.
34. Lennox, W G and Cobb, S, Aura in epilepsy: a statistical review of 1359 cases. Archives of Neurology and Psychiatry 30:374-387, 1933 .
35. Keschner, M, Bender,M B and Strauss, I, Mental symptoms in cases of tumor of the temporal lobe. Archives of Neurology and Psychiatry 35:572-596, 1936.
36. Marcovitz, E, The meaning of déjà vu. Psychoanalytic Quarterly 21: 481-489, 1952.
37. Maudsley H, The double brain. Mind 54: 161-187, 1889.
38. Myers, F W H, The subliminal mind. Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research 11: 334-407, 1895.
39. Neppe, V M, The Psychology of Déja vu: Have I Been Here Before? Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press. 1983.
40. Osborn, H F, Illusions of memory. North American Review 138: 476-486, 1884.
41. Ovid, Metarnorphoses, Book XV: 161-164.
42. "Quaerens", A prognostic and therapeutic indication in epilepsy. The Practitioner 4:284-285, 1870.
43. Sander, W, Ueber Erinnerungstäuschungen [On memory illusions]. Archiv für Psychichiatrie und Nervenkrankheiten 4:244-253, 1874.
44. Scott, Sir W, Guy Mannering or The Astrologer, Edinburgh: J Ballantyne & Co. 1815.
45. Shelley, P B, Speculations on metaphysics. The Works of Percy Byesse Shelly in Verse and Prose. London: Reeves & Turner. 1880.
46. Von Franz, M-L, Number and Time. London: Rider & Company, 1974.
47. Weidemeister F, Ueber doppeltes Bewusstsein bei Geisteskranken [On double consciousness in the mentally ill]. Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Psychiatrie 27: 711-, 1871.
48. Wigan, A L, The Duality of the Mind. London: Longman, Brown, Green & Longman, 1844.